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Consistent with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1) and (b), the caption of this case contains 
a complete list of all parties to the proceedings below. Nonetheless, the parties to this 
i 
action are as follows: 
1. Appellant/Plaintiff: Steven Van Den Eikhof 
2. Appellee/Defendant: Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)0), § 78A-3-102(4) and § 78A-4-103(2)G). On January 20, 2011, the Supreme 
Court of Utah entered an order transferring this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at 
534). 
REVISED STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the appellant to submit 
"a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Additionally, 
each issue stated must include "citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court." Id. Van Den Eikhof s "Issues Presented for Review55 lacks 
this required information. In order to properly focus the scope of appellate review, Vista 
School will provide the standard of appellate review, inclusive of supporting authority, 
for each of Van Den Eikhof s stated issues. However, Van Den Eikhof alone bears the 
burden of showing that he properly preserved each of his stated issues for appeal. 
Accordingly, Vista School declines to do so for him. 
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court err in deeming unanswered admissions as 
admitted when the method of service was at issue? Standard of Review: Correctness -
The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, which the appellate 
courts review for correctness. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ^  6, 2 P.3d 948; see 
1 
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also Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings. L.L.C.. 2010 UT 40, If 10, 238 P.3d 1035. 
Issue Number 2: Did the trial court err in deeming unanswered admissions as 
admitted when the admissions sought admissions to legal conclusions? Standard of 
Review: Correctness - The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law, which the appellate courts review for correctness. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 
143, Tf 6, 2 P.3d 948; see also Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C., 2010 UT 
40, f 10,238P.3dl035. 
Issue Number 3: Did the trial court err in ruling that the deemed admissions were 
determinative in defeating Van Den Eikhof s causes of action? Standard of Review: 
Abuse of Discretion - If after an appellate court concludes the trial court's interpretation 
of Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a) was correct and it is then called upon to review the trial court's 
refusal to permit withdrawal of admissions under Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b), the abuse of 
discretion standard is the proper appellate standard of review. State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT 
App 143 at ffl[ 6-7 (citing Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 
(Utah 1998)). 
Issue Number 4: Did the trial court err in denying Van Den Eikhof s Motion to 
Amend or Withdraw Admissions? Standard of Review: Conditional Discretionary 
Standard - Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to withdraw admissions under 
a "conditional discretionary standard," first determining whether certain conditions have 
been met and then determining whether the trial court abused the discretion that is 
allowed once the conditions have been met. Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, fflf 9, 
2 
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11-12, 178 P.3d 930, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008) (citing Langelandv. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., supra); accord State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 143 at f 7. 
Issue Number 5: Did the trial court err in striking Van Den Eikhof s affidavit 
filed in opposition to Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment? Standard of 
Review: Broad Grant of Discretion (a very liberal version of the Abuse of Discretion 
Standard) - In Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp., the Utah Supreme Court ruled as 
follows: 
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits. 
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of fact 
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of 
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of 
evidence varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example, 
in State v. Pena, we stated that the decision to admit evidence under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the [discretion] spectrum" 
like u[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence [that] also generally 
entail a good deal of discretion." . . . In civil cases such as the present one, 
where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the 
type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court 
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. 
1999 UT 39,1| 25, 982 P.2d 65 (citations omitted, alterations in original). 
Issue Number 6: Did the trial court err in granting Vista School's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? Standard of Review: Correctness - The appellate courts resolve 
only legal issues in reviewing a summary judgment, giving no deference to the trial 
court's view of the law, but reviewing it for correctness, Wilkinson v. Washington City, 
2010 UT App 56, % 4, 230 P.3d 136. 
3 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 1) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 2) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (See full text of rule in Van Den Eikhof s Addendum No. 3) 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (See full text of rule in Vista School's Addendum No. 1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about April 29, 2009, Vista School sent Van Den Eikhof, an applicant for 
employment as a teacher, a written conditional offer of employment. Afterward, a 
dispute arose between the parties as to the terms of the conditional offer and effect of 
issuing the letter. Vista School contended it was not a binding offer of employment and, 
further, even if it was, Van Den Eikhof had not fulfilled the stated preconditions to accept 
the offer. Van Den Eikhof contended that the conditional offer of employment was a 
binding offer, which he accepted; and, further, that after he accepted the offer, Vista 
School reneged on the offer to his legal detriment. (R. at 1-28, passim). 
Thereafter, on November 20, 2009, Van Den Eikhof made written demand upon 
Vista School's former counsel to compensate him for lost wages and benefits and 
punitive damages. Vista School rejected Van Den Eikhof s written demand, resulting in 
the filing of this lawsuit. (R. at 1-28, passim). 
On May 19 (via email) and 20 (via U.S. Mail), 2010, Vista School propounded its 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of 
Documents to Van Den Eikhof ("First Set of Discovery Requests"). Van Den Eikhof 
4 
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failed to serve timely responses to the First Set of Discovery Requests, including the
 { 
Requests for Admissions.1 On August 2, 2010, approximately six weeks after the 
deadline had passed for responding to the First Set of Discovery Requests, Vista School 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which was based on the legal effect of the 
deemed admissions and Van Den Eikhof s noncompliance with various provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("GI A"). (R. at 80-103, passim). < 
Upon receiving Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment, Van Den Eikhof s 
counsel contacted Vista School's counsel, claiming to have never received the First Set of 
Discovery Requests and requesting that Vista School voluntarily withdraw its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Vista School's counsel reminded Van Den Eikhof s counsel that 
the First Set of Discovery Requests had been transmitted via email as well as regular U.S. 
Mail, and that Van Den Eikhof s counsel had electronically responded to the transmittal 
email. Van Den Eikhof s counsel acknowledged receipt of the email containing the First 
Set of Discovery Requests, but claimed not to have opened the email attachment with the 
First Set of Discovery Requests and not to have received a paper copy of the First Set of 
Discovery Requests in the U.S. Mail. (R. at 365-368, passim). 
Vista School's counsel advised Van Den Eikhof s counsel that Vista School would 
not voluntarily withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment because the motion dealt i 
with more than just the legal effect of the deemed admissions; specifically, Van Den 
1
 To this day, Van Den Eikhof has never served responses to any of Vista School's First 
Set of Discovery Requests. (R. at 477, *[[5). 
5 
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Eikhof s failure to comply with the written notice of claim and other requirements of the 
GIA. Instead, Vista School's counsel suggested that the parties more earnestly explore 
settlement options and agreed to indefinitely extend the deadline for Van Den Eikhof to 
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Vista School's counsel understood that 
Van Den Eikhof s counsel agreed to this approach. However, a few days later, Van Den 
Eikhof served the following motions upon Vista School: (1) Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims; (2) Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions; 
(3) Motion to Amend Complaint; and (4) Motion for Sanctions. At this same time, Van 
Den Eikhof also filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's] Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 365-368, passim). 
On October 20, 2010, the trial court convened a hearing on all of the foregoing 
motions as well as Vista School's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den 
Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010. The trial court granted all of Vista School's motions and 
denied all of Van Den Eikhof s motions. (R. at 467; 536, passim). Van Den Eikhof is 
now pursuing this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As with the other sections of his appellate brief, Van Den Eikhof has failed to cite 
to the record when setting forth his Statement of Facts. Accordingly, this Court may 
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court. See Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning "[i]f a party fails to make a concise 
statement of the facts and a citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
6 
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supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. This Court need
 { 
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record."); 
accord Steele v. Bd. of Review Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Accordingly, this Court may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s Statement of Facts and 
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court. 
Notwithstanding, in accordance with Utah R. App. 24(a)(7), Vista School sets < 
forth the following facts from the trial court's various orders, inclusive of citations to the 
record, that are determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Order Denying Van Den EikhoFs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
1. Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions centered on 
his contention that he was never properly served with Vista School's First Set of 
Discovery Requests, including the Requests for Admissions. (R. at 492, j^ 1). 
2. The Certificate of Discovery for Vista School's First Set of Discovery 
Requests states that service was effectuated upon Van Den Eikhof s counsel by email and 
U.S. Mail. (R. at 51-52). 
3. Van Den Eikhof s counsel acknowledged that he received the transmittal 
email to which Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests were attached as an 
exhibit. (R. at 126, If 1; 131,12; 222, f 2; 226, f 1; 362, f 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11). 
4. The trial court determined that the testimony and exhibits (R. at 281-312) 
proffered in the multiple affidavits (R. at 276-280; 365-368) of Vista School's counsel as 
well as Van Den Eikhof s counsel's acknowledgment that he opened at least some of the 
7 
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attachments to the email, "clearly preponderated" in favor of Van Den Eikhof having 
been properly served with [Vista School's] First Set of Discovery Requests—via email 
and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492,12; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). 
5. Additionally, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s motion and 
memoranda wholly failed to follow the standards promulgated by Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) 
and Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) to properly move a 
court to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions. (R. at 492-495, ffif 4-11; 536, pp. 
10:8-11:23). 
Order Granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment 
6. Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment dealt with two issues: first, 
the effect of the deemed admission; and, second, Van Den Eikhof s failure to comply 
with various provisions of the GIA. (R. at 63-103, passim; 181-227, passim). 
7. The trial court's Order Granting [Vista School's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment addressed both of these issues as well as the legal consequences of Van Den 
Eikhof s failure to properly oppose Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment in 
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e). (R. at 476-490, passim: 536, pp. 11:24-
12:16). 
8. Vista School propounded its First Set of Discovery Requests, inclusive of 
Requests for Admissions, to Van Den Eikhof via email on May 19, 2010, and via U.S. 
Mail on May 20, 2010. (R. at 477, ffif 1-2). 
9. Vista's First Set of Discovery Requests advised Van Den Eikhof that the 
8 
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Requests for Admissions would be deemed admitted unless Van Den Eikhof served 
responses within 30 days from the date propounded. (R. at 83-84; 477,1} 4). 
10. Van Den Eikhof has never served written responses to any of Vista 
School's First Set of Discovery Requests, including the Requests for Admissions, (R, at 
477, Tj 5). 
11. In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2), the trial court concluded that 
the Requests for Admissions became "conclusively established facts." (R. at 477-478, fflf 
6-7). 
12. The trial court then concluded that the deemed admissions became 
undisputed material facts for purposes of summary judgment; and as such, one or more of 
the necessary elements for each of Van Den Eikhof s causes of action was conclusively 
disproved. (R. at 478-484, passim). 
13. Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action was for "Breach of Contract, 
Refusal to Honor Original Offer." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the 
alleged contract: 
The Defendant made a clear offer of employment on or about April 29, 
2009 for a base salary of $34,622.00 . . . in writing to Plaintiff. Defendant 
instructed Plaintiff to sign said offer to accept the contract. 
Plaintiff accepted this contract by signing Defendant's offer on May 1, 
2009 and also by complying with all of its terms for employment 
Defendant issued a different offer which had a base salary of $30,576.65 . . 
. which was $4,045.35 . . . less than the original signed contract. 
Defendant mandated that Plaintiff sign to maintain employment with 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant for the 2009/2010 school year. 
When Plaintiff refused to sign the new offer, seeking to remain with his 
original contract he had made with Defendant, he was terminated. 
(R. at 8-9, U161-65; 479,1f 10). 
14. The trial court reasoned that the admitted facts established that Van Den 
Eikhof had to approve and sign a Salary Agreement as a condition precedent to the 
formation of a contract, which he never did as evidenced by the following Requests for 
Admissions: 
Please admit that the Vista Letter [the April 29, 2009 letter] contained 
conditions that had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista 
School. Admission 2. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve as a formal 
employment agreement. Admission 3. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will complete a "hiring 
process." Admission 4. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to sign a Salary 
Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School. Admission 
5. 
Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with Vista School. 
Admission 6. 
Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a Salary 
Agreement on or about August 14, 2009. Admission 7. 
(R. at 480, f 13). 
15. Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action was for "Breach of Contract-
Nonpayment of Benefits." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged 
10 
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contract to pay particular benefits: 
Within the benefits package that Plaintiff accepted in Defendant's offer, 
said benefits would amount to approximately $1,389.00 . . . per month in 
cash value. 
On or about August 13, 2009, Plaintiff and other employees were told by 
Principal that School's intention was to give 100% paid medical insurance 
premiums. 
Defendant included benefits within the first written contract amounting to 
approximately $1,389.00 . . . a month, which was also promised orally to 
Plaintiff 
Defendant failed to provide said benefits to Plaintiff. 
(R. at 9-10,1fl| 21, 39, 69 and 70; 480-481,114). 
16. The trial court reasoned that the following Requests for Admissions 
invalidated Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action: 
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written 
agreement wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no 
cost to you as alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint. Admission 17. 
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written 
agreement that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as 
alleged in Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint. Admission 18. 
(R. at 481,1|i5). 
17. Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action was for "Fraud and Fraud in 
Inducement." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged fraud: 
Defendant made representations within its first contract offer that were 
accepted that Plaintiff would have a teaching position with a base pay of 
$34,622.00 . . . . Such representations were furthered by oral statements, the 
fact that Plaintiff was sent for training in California, and the fact that 
Plaintiff attended a week long teacher training in St. George over the 
11 
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summer with no other contract offers until the school year had already 
started at Washington County School District and George Washington 
Academy. 
Vista School's representations were material facts made to induce Plaintiff 
to work for School. The fact that a second contract was offered to Plaintiff 
so late caused harm to Plaintiff in that he could not find another teaching 
position. 
Plaintiff reasonably relied on the original contract, relied on the fact that it 
would not be altered for at least the 2009/2010 school year, and gave up 
another teaching position based on the original salary agreed to by 
Defendant. 
Defendant knew or should have known that such a move would compel 
Plaintiff to accept the contract offer. 
(R. at 10,1fl[ 73-76; 481-482, ^ 17). 
18. In regards to the alleged fraud claims, the trial court reasoned that the 
formation of an employment contract was the "presently existing material fact" upon 
which the entire fraud claim was predicated. However, Requests for Admissions Nos. 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17 and 18 clearly established that an employment contract was never formed. 
(R. at 482419). 
19. Additionally, the trial court determined the following Requests for 
Admissions eliminated Van Den Eikhof s ability to claim there was an inducement and 
justified reliance upon it, which are necessary elements to prove fraud: 
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista reception as 
alleged in Paragraph 32 of your Complaint. Admission 14. 
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training 
as alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint. Admission 15. 
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Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training
 ( 
rr\t if 
o-n^g^vi 1x1 J. a i a ^ i d p i i ^ o u i ) u u i ^ u i i i p i a i n i . -M.UIIII»»JLUII ± u . 
Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications with employees or 
representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to 
actually receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. Admission 29. < 
Please admit that you were made aware on or before August 2, 2009 that 
Vista School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had 
originally believed. Admission 30. 
i 
Please admit that you had communications with a Vista School employee 
regarding your base salary on or before August 25 2009. Admission 31. 
Please admit that George Washington Academy never presented you with a 
written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year. Admission 32. ' 
(R. at 482-483^ 20). 
20. Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action was for "Negligent 
Misrepresentation-Defendant waited until the start of the fall school year to propose a 
new contract." Van Den Eikhof contended as follows regarding the alleged negligent 
misrepresentation: 
In the alternative to any fraud causes of action, Plaintiff asserts negligent 
misrepresentation with the fact that Defendant waited until after the 
2009/2010 school year had started within Washington County in an attempt 
to force Plaintiff to accept a new contract for lower pay and lesser benefits 
knowing that he would be unable to find another teaching position with 
another school. 
Defendant made representations that were at least negligent and careless so 
as to induce action by Plaintiff to accept the contract offered. 
Defendant had a duty of care to Plaintiff to act reasonably which would 
have included giving Plaintiff adequate notice ahead of time of the 
contractual change to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek other teaching 
positions if he so chose to do so. 
13 
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(R. at 11, H 78-80; 483-484, % 22). 
21. The trial court reasoned that the same Requests for Admissions that 
defeated Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action for fraud likewise defeated his Fourth 
Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation. If there was no contract there could 
have been no false representations about a non-existent contract. The trial court similarly 
observed there was no way for a claimant to validly assert reasonable reliance upon the 
formation of a contract he acknowledged never existed. (R. at 484, ^ 24). 
22. Van Den Eikhof s Fifth Cause of Action was for "Attorneys [sic] fees and 
Costs." The trial court reasoned that Van Den Eikhof would have to first prevail on one 
or more of his other causes of action and then establish a contractual or statutory basis 
under Utah law before he would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
Since he could do neither, the trial court also dismissed this claim as a matter of law. (R. 
at 484,U 25). 
23. The trial court observed that the Utah Strategic Planning Act for 
Educational Excellence, the statute creating public charter schools, provides as follows: 
"An employee of a charter school is a public employee and the governing body is a 
public employer in the same manner as a local school board for purposes of tort liability." 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-514(l). Under Utah law, public school boards and school 
districts are "political subdivisions" and therefore "governmental entities" as provided by 
the GIA. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(3) and (7). Therefore, the trial court determined 
14 
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Vista School was a political subdivision and a governmental entity of the State of Utah. 
(R. at 485, If 26). 
24. Van Den Eikhof s Complaint against Vista School was brought in 
professed compliance with the GIA, (R. at 1-2, fflf 2-5; 485,1128), 
25. The trial court observed that the GIA prohibits judgments against 
governmental entities for exemplary or punitive damages. (R. at 485, ^ f 29). 
26. Accordingly, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s claims for 
"punitive damages for pain and suffering as well as loss of financial opportunities in the 
amount of three times (3X) the amount of judgment^]" must be dismissed as a matter of 
law. (R. at 486,130). 
27. The trial court additionally observed that the GIA provides absolute 
immunity from suit for claims arising out of or in connection with "infliction of mental 
anguish . . . [and] misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional"; and, therefore, to the extent Van Den Eikhof intended when praying for 
damages "for pain and suffering" for infliction of mental anguish to assert such a claim, 
it, along with his claim for negligent misrepresentation, were absolutely barred. (R. at 
486, m 31-32). 
28. Finally, the trial court observed that "Van Den Eikhof s effort to oppose 
Vista [School's] Motion for Summary Judgment was wholly deficient. (R. at 486, Tf 33). 
29. The main point of argument in Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in 
Response to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment was his contention that his 
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counsel was never properly served with Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests. 
(R. at 134-135; 486, t 34). 
30. The trial court determined as follows: 
Examination of Vista's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that 
every assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance 
with Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the 
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for 
Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and sequence 
for the filing of [Vista School's] First Discovery Request. Therefore, each 
of the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed 
material facts that Van Den Eikhof had an obligation to oppose by affidavit 
or as otherwise provided by Rules 56(c) and (e). 
Conversely, examination of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response 
to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment reveals that it was not 
supported by any affidavits, references to Vista's pleadings, or any other 
form of evidence required under Rule 56(c) to properly oppose a motion for 
summary judgment. 
(R. at 487, ffl[ 36-37; 536, p. 12:2-8). 
31. The trial court went on to conclude as follows: 
Since Van Den Eikhof s opposition memorandum is facially defective, the 
Court may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s "Facts in Dispute" and 
enter summary judgment in favor of Vista because the Affidavit of J. 
Gregory Hardman in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment established a prima facie case for summary judgment. 
(R. at 488,t 39). 
Order Granting Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit 
32. The trial court struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit because it was untimely 
filed and replete with evidentiary problems. (R. at 507-512, passim; see Van Den 
Eikhof s Affidavit, R. at 263-264). 
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33. On August 2, 2010, Vista School filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of [Vista School's] Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 60; 63; 507, ^ 1). 
34. The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Vista School's 
Memorandum was supported by the affidavit of its counsel. (R. at 80-103; 507, f^ 2). 
35. On August 11,2010, Van Den Eikhof filed his Memorandum in Response 
to [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, which was not supported by any 
affidavit or other form of evidence as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). (R. at 134-142; 
507,13). 
36. On August 25, 2010, Vista School filed its Reply Memorandum in Support 
of [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 181; 507,14). 
37. Van Den Eikhof s failure to properly support his responsive memorandum 
with affidavits or other required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in 
[Vista School's] Reply Memorandum. (R. at 507,14). 
38. Furthermore, Van Den Eikhof filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Breach of Contract Claims on July 29, 2010. (R. at 55; 507, t 5). 
39. On August 19, 2010, Vista School filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Van Den Eikhof s Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims. Van 
Den Eikhof s failure to properly support his Memorandum with affidavits or other 
required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in Vista School's 
Memorandum in Opposition. (R. at 151; 507-508, J^ 6). 
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40. On August 26, 2010, Vista School's counsel received a certified mail 
envelope in which was enclosed, among other documents, a copy of the Affidavit of 
Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010. (R. at 389, t 7; 412; 508, f 6). 
41. The trial court determined that "Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit [was] 
procedurally defective because it was filed weeks after his Memorandum in Response to 
[Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 508, | 8). 
42. The trial court also determined that Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires affidavits 
and other evidentiary materials to be filed contemporaneously with the responsive 
memorandum they support. (R. at 508,19; 536, p. 9:1-8). 
43. The trial court observed as follows: 
[Van Den Eikhof] filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's] 
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. [Van Den 
Eikhof s] Memorandum in Response makes absolutely no reference to any 
supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, [Van Den 
Eikhof] submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time, 
Vista School had already properly opposed [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as well as issued [Vista 
School's] Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
(R. at 509, If 10). 
44. Upon examining Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, the trial court determined "it 
[was] nothing more than a non-specific form affidavit^]" and the alleged facts it sought 
to incorporate by reference (i.e., the factual allegations and arguments of Van Den 
Eikhof s legal counsel) were "clearly not based on [Van Den Eikhof s] first-hand, 
personal knowledge . . ." and contained inappropriate lay witness opinion testimony and 
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legal conclusions. (R. at 509- 511, fflf 14-21; 536, p. 9:9-11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Vista School's arguments follow two lines of analysis. The first line of analysis 
concerns the legal effects of Van Den Eikhof s failure to follow nearly all of the appellate 
briefing requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 and discrepancies between his Notice of 
Intent to Appeal and Brief of the Appellants [sic]. The second line of analysis examines 
the trial court's creation of a proper procedural foundation in disposing of the parties5 
various interlocutory motions, which, in turn, then properly supported the trial court's 
legal conclusions when granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Regarding the first line of analysis, the following conventions of Utah R. App. 24 
have been violated by Van Den Eikhof: subsection (e) - no citations to the record; 
subsection (a)(5) - no standard of appellate review or supportive legal authorities for 
each of his stated issues; subsection (a)(5)(A) - no citation to the record showing issues 
preserved in the trial court; subsection (a)(7) - no citations to the record for statement of 
facts in accordance with subsection (e); and subsection (a)(9) - most of the argument 
section lacks citations to legal authorities. Subsection (k) of this rale provides as follows: 
"Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(k) (2008). Many of the case annotations to Rule 24 discuss an 
appellate court's prerogative to reject such a brief. See, e.g., MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 
941, 947-49 (Utah 1998) (the Supreme Court declined to address any of the arguments in 
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a brief that failed to meet almost every requirement of Rule 24). Lastly, Van Den Eikhof 
has not briefed three of the six orders on motions referenced in his Notice of Intent to 
Appeal; namely, the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Breach of Contract Claims, the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion to Amend 
Complaint, and the Order Denying [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for Sanctions. The Court 
should therefore refuse to entertain Van Den Eikhof s appeal of these orders. 
Regarding the second line of analysis, by not addressing the standards of review 
for each of his issues and disregarding the trial court's systematic treatment of the 
interlocutory motions (e.g., Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit and Motion to 
Amend or Withdraw Admissions), Van Den Eikhof has inappropriately leapt to a facial 
examination of the writing allegedly forming a contract between the parties. He argues 
the mere fact the parties disagree over the legal effect of the writing precluded the trial 
court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. He also attempts to 
excuse his failure to comply with the requirements of Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure when opposing Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. These 
arguments are misplaced. 
There was indeed a purpose to the order in which the trial court ruled on the 
parties' motions. The trial court first examined Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den 
Eikhof s Affidavit. The trial court, applying its "broad grant of discretion" when 
examining evidence of this type, correctly concluded that the affidavit was untimely and 
fraught with evidentiary problems. Once stricken, Van Den Eikhof s opposition to Vista 
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School's Motion for Summary Judgment was stripped of any proper evidence to oppose 
the Motion. The next interlocutory motion considered by the trial court was Van Den 
Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. Utah appellate courts have been 
clear in their direction to trial courts when reviewing motions to amend or withdraw 
admissions: they must apply the two-part test explained in Langeland. 952 P.2d at 1060 
(observing that "judicial discretion is permitted only after certain preliminary conditions 
have been met"); accord Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 
1985); Kotterv.Kotter. 2009 UT App 60, f 16, 206 P.3d 633. The trial court 
appropriately observed that Van Den Eikhof did not even mention the Langeland test or 
attempt to apply its principles in his moving memorandum, thereby preventing the trial 
court from ever getting to a point where it was permitted to exercise discretion regarding 
the withdrawal or amendment of the deemed admissions. Therefore, when reviewing 
Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment and determining that Vista School had 
properly supported all of its statement of undisputed material facts, the trial court had no 
choice other than to grant Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. See, e.g., 
Kotter, 2009 UT App 60 at % 22 (holding that the trial court committed reversible error 
when it denied summary judgment based upon requests for admissions that were deemed 
admitted when no timely responses were served). 
ARGUMENT 
i. Van Den Eikhof has failed to properly cite to the record and comply with 
most other briefing requirements set forth in Utah R. App. P. 24; accordingly, 
his brief should be disregarded or stricken pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
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Examination of Van Den Eikhof s Brief of Appellants [sic] (hereinafter "Van Den 
Eikhof Brief') demonstrates that it fails to meet nearly every requirement of Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Perhaps most grievous of his multiple offenses is 
his failure, throughout his brief, to cite to the record. Subsection (e) is clear in its 
mandate: "References [in appellate briefs] shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b). . . ." Utah R. App. P. 24(e) (emphasis 
added). 
Subsection (a)(5) requires an appellant to "provide a statement of the issues 
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority." Id. at 24(a)(5). Although Van Den Eikhof sets forth six issues for 
review, none of them contains a standard of appellate review with supportive legal 
authority. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 3-4). Utah appellate courts have observed as 
follows: 
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be 
ignored. The purpose of this requirement is to focus the briefs, thus 
promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals. 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When an appellant ignores 
this important requirement an appellate court may "assume the correctness of the trial 
court's judgment." Id 
Subsection (a)(7) requires an appellant's brief to contain a statement of facts: "All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
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to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) 
(emphasis added). Not only did Van Den Eikhof fail to properly cite to the record for his 
statement of facts and proceedings below, nearly all of what he cites contradicts the 
record! For example, in the very last sentence of the "Background" portion of Van Den 
Eikhof s Statement of Facts, he states: "At the negotiation, it was determined that [Van 
Den Eikhof] was constructively terminated from his position with Vista due to his failure 
to accept the reduced offer." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The trial court made no such 
finding of constructive termination. Further still, in the last sentence of the first 
paragraph of the "Procedural Facts " portion of Van Den Eikhof s brief, he states: "no 
agreement had been reached in regard to service by email and [Van Den Eikhof] logically 
assumed that the email was a "heads up" or courtesy." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The 
trial court made no such finding of fact. Relatedly, in the very next sentence, Van Den 
Eikhof states as follows: 
Apparently, [Vista School's] secretary signed a Certificate of Service 
alleging that the discovery "originals" were sent on May 20, 2011 [sic]. 
Whether due to a mistake by this secretary or by the postal service, these 
discovery papers never arrived at the office of [Van Den Eikhof s] counsel. 
(Van Den Eikhof Brief at 6). The trial court never made these findings of fact. To the 
contrary, the trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof was properly served with Vista 
School's First Set of Discovery Requests by email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, % 2; 536, 
pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). Further still, Van Den Eikhof states: "Defense counsel 
refused to extend any time to answer the improperly served discovery or to acknowledge 
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that a mistake might have been made by his office or the post office." (Van Den Eikhof 
Brief at 7). Again, the trial court never made these findings; it determined service was 
properly effectuated by email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492,12; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and 
17:2-11). Additionally, Vista School's counsel's affidavit flatly contradicts Van Den 
Eikhof s counsel's summary of the attorneys' discussions about this point. (R. at 365-
368). More importantly, in regards to the Requests for Admissions, an extension of time 
was not even possible since, by operation of law, they were long since deemed admitted. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). Further still, Van Den Eikhof states as a procedural fact the 
following: "Appellant's counsel filed the appropriate motions to amend or withdraw as 
well as an opposition memorandum to the Motion for Summary Judgment." (Van Den 
Eikhof Brief at 7). Quite apart from being "appropriate motions and briefs," the trial 
court determined all of the briefs filed by Van Den Eikhof in regards to these two 
motions were wholly deficient. (R. at 476-490, passim; 536, pp. 11:24-12:16; 492-495, 
ffl[ 4-11; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23). Finally, Van Den Eikhof puts forth the following as a 
procedural fact: "The judge then deemed all admissions as admitted, struck Appellee's 
[sic] affidavit in support of its [sic] opposition to the Summary Judgment, and granted 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment despite the fact that a clear contract had 
been formed with the self-labeled 'offer of employment9 and subsequent acceptance" 
(emphasis added). (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 7). The trial court never found the parties 
formed a "clear contract" or that it was "accepted." 
Subsection (a)(9), covering the argument section of appellate briefs, requires 
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"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). As discussed above, nowhere in his brief does Van Den Eikhof cite to the 
record. Moreover, the entire argument section of his brief contains citations to only two 
cases; and in one of these, he misquotes the cited passage and misstates the holding of the 
case. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 13-14). Consequently, there is no legal authority to 
support much of what Van Den Eikhof argues is law. Subsection (a)(9) also requires 
arguments that "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). As discussed above, Van 
Den Eikhof listed no appellate standards of review or supporting authorities for each of 
his issues. As such, the argument section of his brief contains none of the required 
analysis applying proper standards of appellate review to the trial court's rulings on 
2
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follows: "'Admit you lose5 type requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are 
objectionable and not a proper basis for admission." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 13). Such 
quoted text is nowhere found within this case. Admittedly, the concept of admissions 
calling for legal conclusions is discussed in this case. Id at 100-01. Notwithstanding, 
the Jensen court, addressing a somewhat similar situation as this matter on appeal, stated: 
"However, even if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to respond 
to the request, the party should be held to have admitted the matter." Id. Van Den 
Eikhof additionally contends that the admissions at issue in this appeal are of the "exact 
type" contemplated by the court in Jensen. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 14). They are not. 
In Jensen, the single objectionable request justifying court intervention on principles of 
equity sought an admission that "plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages." Id. at 101. 
The Utah Supreme Court observed that the problem with this admission was that among 
the other matters deemed admitted there were "no admissions concerning several of the 
factors which should be considered in determining the amount of the punitive damages 
award." Id Accordingly, the case v/as "remanded to the trial court for a trial on the issue 
of punitive damages and entry of judgment according to the matters deemed 
admitted by defendant." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Jensen does not stand for 
the propositions of law asserted by Van Den Eikhof. 
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appeal. Instead, the argument section of Van Den Eikhof s brief is largely a recitation of 
his failed arguments to the trial court. 
As documented above, Van Den Eikhof s brief is defective on many fronts. 
Subsection (k), entitled ''[r]Requirements and sanctions, " states, in pertinent part, as 
follows: "Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion 
or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). An appellate brief that sets forth little legal analysis on 
the issues presented, does not specifically discuss how the trial court erred, and presents 
no citations to the record fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 24. Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). When presented with such a 
brief, an appellate court may properly disregard the brief and assume the correctness of 
the judgment of the trial court. MacKav v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 947-49 (Utah 1998) (the 
Supreme Court declined to address any of the arguments in a brief that failed to meet 
almost every requirement of Rule 24); accord Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1110; Koulis, 746 
P.2d at 1185. This Court should similarly reject Van Den Eikhof s brief and assume the 
correctness of the trial court's judgment. 
2. Van Den Eikhof s Notice of Intent to Appeal challenges the trial court's 
rulings on six motions. Notwithstanding, his Brief of Appellants [sic] confines 
these appellate proceedings to only three of the six motions and 
corresponding orders: the Order Granting Vista School's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Order Denying Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend 
or Withdraw Admissions, and the Order Granting Vista School's Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof. 
Van Den Eikhof s Notice of Intent to Appeal lists the following orders of the trial 
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I 
court for appeal: 
(a) Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(b) Order Denying Plaintiffs Molion to Amend Complaint; 
(c) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of 
Contract Claims; 
(d) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions; 
(e) Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions; [and] 
(f) Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven 
Van Den Eikhof, Dated August 25, 2010. 
(R. at 527-528). However, in his Brief of Appellants [sic] he does not include any of the 
required information for this Court to consider the Order Denying Plaintiff s Motion to 
Amend Complaint, the Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Breach of Contract Claims, or the Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions. 
Accordingly, this Court should refuse to entertain Van Den Eikhof s appeal of these three 
orders and affirm the trial court's rulings as to each. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 947-48 
(observing that "the [Utah Supreme Court], as well as the court of appeals, has held in 
numerous cases that [they] will not address issues not adequately briefed"). 
3. The trial court properly struck Van Den EikhoPs Affidavit because it was 
untimely filed and replete with evidentiary problems. 
When examining the trial court's decision to strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, 
this Court must review the trial court's decision "on the broad end of the discretion 
spectrum." Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39,125, 982 P.2d 65. The 
trial court struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit because it was untimely filed and replete 
with evidentiary problems. (R. at 507-512, passim; see Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, R. at 
263-264). 
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In regards to the timeliness of Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, Rule 56(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure implies that affidavits and other evidentiary materials must be 
filed contemporaneously with the responsive memorandum. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). The trial court observed that the proper 
interpretation of Rule 56(e) required affidavits to be filed contemporaneously with the 
memorandum they support. (R. at 536, p. 9:1-8). The trial court likewise observed that 
every assertion of undisputed material fact in Vista School's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was properly supported by an affidavit and that no part of Van Den Eikhof s 
opposition memorandum was properly supported. (R. at 487, fflf 36-37). When a motion 
for summary judgment is filed and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the 
motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by 
Rule 56(e). D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). This affirmative 
duty to respond by submitting a counter-affidavit or other appropriate materials would 
have no meaning if the time to do so was other than contemporaneously with the 
opposition memorandum. Therefore, the trial court very clearly did not abuse its 
discretion when holding Van Den Eikhof failed to timely discharge this affirmative duty. 
Van Den Eikhof argues that he simply forgot to attach his Affidavit to his 
opposition memorandum, implying a clerical oversight. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 17). 
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This Court, like the trial court, should find this assertion highly suspect. (R. at 536, 11:2-
9). The trial court observed as follows: 
[Van Den Eikhof] filed his Memorandum in Response to [Vista School's] 
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. [Van Den 
Eikhof s] Memorandum in Response makes absolutely no reference to any 
supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, [Van Den 
Eikhof] submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time, 
Vista School had already properly opposed [Van Den Eikhof s] Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as well as issued [Vista 
School's] Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
(R. at 509, ^ f 10). Indeed, according to the notary endorsement on Van Den Eikhof s 
Affidavit it was not even signed and notarized until August 25, 2010. (R. at 263-264). 
Next, the trial court examined the content of Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit, 
concluding that it was replete with evidentiary problems. (R. at 508-511,1fl| 7-22; 536, 
9:9-11). The trial court's Order Granting Vista School's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Steven Van Den Eikhof separately examined each evidentiary problem with the Affidavit 
and provided citations to Utah case law rejecting affidavits with such evidentiary defects. 
(R. at 509-511, ffi[ 13-21). 
Striking Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit under these circumstances was not an abuse 
of the trial court's broad grant of discretion. In Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp., 
the appellants contended the trial court erred when it struck certain affidavits found by 
the trial court to be "riddled with hearsay," thereby justifying entry of partial summary 
judgment. 1999 UT App 39 at f 24. When determining whether it was proper for the 
trial court to have stricken such an affidavit in a civil case, the Utah Supreme Court 
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determined as follows: 
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits. 
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of fact 
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of 
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of 
evidence varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example, 
in State v. Pena, we stated that the decision to admit evidence under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the [discretion] spectrum" 
like "[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence [that] also generally 
entail a good deal of discretion." . . . In civil cases such as the present one, 
where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the 
type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court 
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. 
IdL at |^ 25 (internal citations omitted, alterations in original). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court could not have abused its broad grant of 
discretion when it struck Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
trial court must be affirmed. 
4. Van Den Eikhof wholly failed to satisfy the two-part Langeland test, thereby 
justifying the trial court's denial of Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw Admissions. 
Van Den Eikhof asserts that the trial court "abused its discretion when it 
disallowed the Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions." (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 
16). He further suggests that the two-part test explained by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998), does not apply to him. 
(Van Den Eikhof Brief at 16-17). Van Den Eikhof s argument is misplaced. 
In Langeland, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the proper procedures parties must 
follow and the test trial courts must apply in regards to a Rule 36(b) motion for 
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withdrawal or amendment of admissions. Id at 1060-64. The following statements, 
explanations and analyses from Langeland are instructive: 
Our decisions interpreting [Rule 36(b)] have used similar language, 
conditioning the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's 
preliminary conditions: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are 
conclusively established as true unless the trial court, on motion by the 
defendant, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. The trial 
court has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions 
when the presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the 
party obtaining the admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be 
prejudiced in maintaining his action. The trial court does not have 
discretion to unilaterally disregard the admissions. 
Id at 1060 (citing Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985)) 
(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court continued its analysis by stating 
[bjecause the trial court's decision to grant a rule 36(b) motion is not 
entirely discretionary, our review of such a decision is not a typical review 
for "abuse of discretion." Instead, we review these decisions in two steps, 
using what might be called a "conditional" discretionary standard. In the 
first step, we review the trial court's determinations as to whether 
amendment or withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits and 
whether amendment or withdrawal would result in prejudice to the 
nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's discretion 
to grant or deny the motion. The trial court has discretion to deny a motion 
to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion conies into play only 
after the preliminary requirements are satisfied. Decisions placed 
within the discretion of the trial court can be reversed only upon a finding 
of abuse of discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. But because the rule does not give the trial 
court discretion to disregard the preliminary conditions of rule 36(b), 
its judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied is 
subject to a somewhat more exacting standard of review. 
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
After announcing the elements of the test to determine whether admissions should 
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be withdrawn or amended, the Supreme Court then explained the responsibilities of the 
parties on each side of a Rule 36(b) motion. 
Having concluded that the burden [to establish the first half of the first 
part of the test, i.e., serving the presentation of the merits] falls on the 
party moving for amendment, we are still faced with the question of just 
how that burden may be met. [The party seeking amendment or 
withdrawal] argues that on the basis of federal court interpretations of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the presentation of the merits of an action 
is served by amending admissions anytime the merits are contested. Clark 
v. City of Munster. Arguing from this authority, [the party seeking 
amendment or withdrawal] submits that its own unsworn denial of the 
matters admitted against it should suffice to convince the court that a 
presentation of the merits would be served by amendment of its admissions. 
However, the time to deny admissions is within thirty days of receiving the 
request for admissions. Once these matters have been admitted against a 
party, something more than a bare denial is required to convince the court 
that the admissions should be withdrawn or amended and that the merits of 
the matter should be argued in court. The test under rule 36(b) may 
therefore be articulated as follows: To show that a presentation of the 
merits of an action would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an 
admission, the party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show 
that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits 
of the underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce some evidence by 
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters 
deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue. 
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Applying this two-part test to the facts of Langeland the Supreme Court 
determined that 
[the party seeking amendment or withdrawal] has failed to come forward 
with evidence of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted 
against it are in fact untrue. Consequently, [the party seeking amendment or 
withdrawal] has not established that the presentation of the case on the 
merits would be subserved by the withdrawal or amendment of the 
admissions. 
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Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that 
[t]he record is devoid of any sworn statement that [the subject admissions 
are] untrue. Instead, both the brief and the motion focus almost exclusively 
on the second-tier requirement that the nonmoving party fails to show 
prejudice from the amendment or withdrawal of the admissions. 
Id. When this occurs, the Supreme Court stated that such failure "relieves the [the non-
moving party] of the burden of showing that he would suffer prejudice as a result of the 
withdrawal or amendment of the admissions." Id. 
The trial court determined that Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw 
Admissions was devoid of any sworn statement or other appropriate evidence to 
challenge the veracity of the deemed admissions. (R. at 495, f 10). Thereafter, following 
the instructions given to trial courts in Langeland, the trial court exercised proper restraint 
in refusing to consider the substance of the admissions (i.e., the second half of the first 
part of the test) because Van Den Eikhof had failed to establish the first half of the first 
part of the test (i.e., serving the presentation of the merits). Under this clear directive 
from the Utah Supreme Court, the trial court had no choice other than to deny Van Den 
Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. See, e.g., Kotter v. Kotter, 2009 
UT App 60, J^ 22, 206 P.3d 633 (finding that summary judgment based upon deemed 
admissions was improperly denied by a trial court). 
The time and method for Van Den Eikhof to have made his argument about the 
alleged inadequacy of service and to otherwise contradict the admissions and show 
prejudice was in an affidavit filed contemporaneously with his motion seeking to set 
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aside the deemed admissions. He did not do so. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial 
court must be affirmed. 
5. Vista School was not required to file a motion to have the Requests for 
Admissions deemed admitted; they were deemed admitted by operation of 
law. 
In the Summary of Arguments section of Van Den Eikhof s brief he suggests that 
Vista School was required to file a motion to deem its admissions admitted. (Van Den 
Eikhof Brief at 8). This is not the law. Rule 36(a) very clearly provides that "matters 
shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service 
of the request." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). Numerous Utah cases reinforce this procedural 
standard. See, e.g.. Kotter. 2009 UT App at ^ 4, n.6; State ex rel. E.R., 2000 UT App 
143,111,2 P.3d 948; Langeland. 952 P.2d at 1060. 
6. The trial court appropriately determined that Van Den Eikhof was properly 
served with Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests by email and U.S. 
Mail. 
As explained above, the trial court determined that the evidence "clearly 
preponderated" in favor of Van Den Eikhof having been properly served with Vista 
School's First Set of Discovery Requests—via email and U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, ^ 2; 536, 
pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). The trial court reached this conclusion following its 
examination of the following matters appearing of record: (1) Vista School's signed 
Certificate of Discovery, which indicated that service was effectuated by email and U.S. 
Mail (R. at 51-52; 477, ^ 3); (2) Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests that 
properly advised Van Den Eikhof that the Requests for Admissions would be deemed 
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admitted if not responded to within 30 days (R. at 83-84; 477, f 4); (3) the affidavits of 
Vista School's counsel pertaining to the details of service, including transmittal email 
with attached First Set of Discovery Requests, law firm postage logs, and emails 
exchanged between counsel (R. at 492, If 2); and (4) Van Den Eikhof s counsel's 
acknowledgements that he received the transmittal email to which Vista School's First 
Set of Discovery Requests were attached as an exhibit (R. at 126, ^ f 1; 131, f^ 2; 222, *[f 2; 
2264 1; 362, If 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11). 
As explained in Vista School's Revised Statement of the Issues above, correctness 
is the proper standard of appellate review to resolve the issue of whether the trial court 
erred in deeming the Requests for Admissions as admitted when the method of service 
was at issue. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the trial court correctly 
interpreted and applied the various procedural rules and Utah cases bearing upon the 
resolution of this issue. 
Van Den Eikhof misstates the trial court's resolution of this issue by singly 
characterizing the trial court's analysis as having determined that service by email was 
effective. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 8 and 10-13). In addition to its determination that 
service by email was effective, the trial court also determined that service was effectuated 
by U.S. Mail. (R. at 492, Tf 2; 536, pp. 10:8-11:23 and 17:2-11). Although the trial court 
found service was effectuated in two ways, the trial court effectively determined that 
either method alone would have been effective and proper service. 
Rules 5 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the applicable rules of 
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procedure that bear on the resolution of this issue. Rule 36(a)(1) requires requests for 
admissions to contain ua notice advising the party to whom the request is made that, 
pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is 
responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer 
time as the court may allow." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). There is no dispute that Vista 
School's First Set of Discovery Requests contained this required notice. (R. at 83-84; 
477, ]f 4). There is likewise no dispute that Van Den Eikhof has never served responses 
to Vista School's Requests for Admissions. (R. 477, | 5). Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly applied the requirements of Rule 36 to this issue. 
Next, Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: "If a party is 
represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon 
the party is ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). Van Den Eikhof was 
represented by counsel so Vista School directed the First Set of Discovery Requests to 
Van Den Eikhof s counsel. (R. at 51-52; 477, ^ 3). Rule 5 additionally provides seven 
alternative means for service of court papers. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)(A). In regards to 
email service, the rule directs "by sending it by email to the person's last known email 
address if that person has agreed to accept service by email." IcL at 5(b)(l)(A)(ii). There 
is no dispute that Van Den Eikhof s counsel received the First Set of Discovery Requests 
by email. (R. at 126, Tf 1; 131,12; 222,12; 226, f 1; 362, % 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11). 
In regards to service by U.S. Mail, the rule provides as follows: "by mailing it to the 
person's last known address." IcL at 5(b)(l)(A)(iv). There is no dispute as to Van Den 
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Eikhof s counsel's last known address; every document he has filed with the trial court
 { 
and this Court contains the same address. Finally, Rule 5 provides the following 
statement as to when service is complete: 
< 
Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by 
electronic means is not effective if the party making service learns that the 
attempted service did not reach the person to be served. 
Id. at 5(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). As stated above, there is no dispute that Van Den { 
Eikhof s counsel received the First Set of Discovery Requests by email. (R. at 126, Tf 1; 
131,12; 222, f 2; 226,11; 362, If 1; 413; 536, pp. 17:2-11). A literal reading of this 
i 
subsection of Rule 5 suggests that the only exception to the general rule that service is 
complete upon sending is when the sender learns that email service did not make it to the 
recipient. Van Den Eikhof s only contention is that he did not receive the First Set of 
Discovery Requests by U.S. Mail. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 10-13). However, as 
explained in the fourth argument section of this brief, when attempting to move the trial
 { 
court to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions, Van Den Eikhof wholly failed to 
meet his burden under the two-part Langeland test, by providing affidavits or any other 
< 
form of evidence, to satisfy the first part of the "presentation of the merits" prong of the 
test. (R. at 495, HTf 10-11). 
Van Den Eikhof attempts, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that he received < 
the First Set of Discovery Requests via email, to avoid the consequences of a literal 
reading of Rule 5 by arguing that his counsel never agreed in writing to accept service by 
i 
email. (Van Den Eikhof Brief at 10-13). There is no merit to this argument. Utah courts 
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have determined that actual notice of discovery requests is sufficient to invoke a timely 
obligation to respond. See, e.g., Aurora Credit Serv., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 
2006 UT App 48, ^ 4, 129 P.3d 287 (citing Morgan v. Continental Banking Co.. 938 P.2d 
271, 275 (Utah 1997) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims under rule 
37 where plaintiff "admitted that he received the discovery requests as well as the motion 
to compel" because it was "disingenuous for [plaintiff] to . . . argue that he was not aware 
of his obligation to respond"); Utah Dep't Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 
1995) (affirming default judgment against defendant under rule 37, even though 
defendant denied receiving some of the discovery motions, because defendant "was given 
ample notice of the proceedings against him and his obligations under the law"). 
In view of the abundant controlling case law—standing for the proposition of law 
that actual notice of discovery requests invokes an obligation to timely respond—the trial 
court determined that Rule 5 required Van Den Eikhof to serve timely responses to Vista 
School's Requests for Admissions following acknowledged receipt of them by Van Den 
Eikhof s counsel. (R. at 536, 11:10-22 and 17:2-11). Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly applied the requirements of Rule 5 and its interpretive case law. 
7. Based on the procedural circumstances of this action there was nothing 
inappropriate about the form of Vista School's Requests for Admissions. 
Admittedly, many of Vista School's Requests for Admissions seek admissions 
applying the law to facts, which are always proper; and some of them may be construed 
as seeking purely matters of law, which would ordinarily be improper. "However, even 
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if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to respond to the request, 
that party should be held to have admitted the request." Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 
Inc., 702 P.2d at 100-01; accord Kotter, 2009 UT App 60 at ffl 17-19; InreE.R., 2000 
UT App 143 at If 21. Accordingly, there is no merit to Van Den Eikhof s argument (Van 
Den Eikhof Brief at 13-14) that the form of two of the deemed admissions prevented the 
trial court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Van 
Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. 
In State ex rel. E.R., the Utah Court of Appeals examined a strikingly similar 
series of facts (sans additional component of service of discovery requests by email) and 
lower court proceedings. 2000 UT App 143, 2 P.3d 948. In re E.R. was an appeal arising 
from an action filed by the State against E.R.'s father, N.R., for alleged abuse of his 
eleven-year-old daughter. Id. at ]f 1. Prior to trial, counsel for N.R. sent the State and the 
Guardian Ad Litem requests for admissions to which they never responded. Id The 
juvenile court deemed the requests admitted in accordance with Rule 36(a), and entered 
judgment in favor of the father "on the strength of the State's and Guardian Ad Litem's 
'admissions.'" Id. The State appealed. Id The appellate court affirmed the judgment of 
the juvenile court. Id. 
Not unlike this matter on appeal, counsel for the father in E.R. served 
interrogatories, requests for productions of documents, and requests for admissions upon 
the State. Id. at j^ 4. The corresponding certificate of service for these discovery requests 
showed that a copy had been mailed to the Attorney General's Office and the Office of 
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the Guardian Ad Litem. Id The father requested that the State and the Guardian Ad 
Litem admit to three things: 
1. Please admit that all injuries to the child, as alleged herein, were not 
inflicted by the natural father. 
2. Please admit that the natural father has neither neglected nor abused said 
child. 
3. Please admit that the child is a dependent. 
Id. No response was submitted by the State or Guardian Ad Litem. Id The day before 
trial, the father filed a motion asking the court to deem those matters admitted. Id. 
On the morning of trial, the father's motion was heard. Id at j^ 5. The State and 
the Guardian Ad Litem argued that "neither had received the father's requests for 
admissions and knew nothing about the request until receiving the motion to enter the 
admissions the previous afternoon." Id. 
Finding that the mailing certificate indicated the discovery request was sent, and 
neither the State nor the Guardian Ad Litem timely responded, the juvenile court 
reasoned that because the requests for admissions "were properly served [pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)], and "were neither objected to nor denied, the father's requests 
were deemed admitted." Id The juvenile court also concluded that the admissions "were 
conclusive on the issue of the father's alleged abuse and no additional evidence would be 
required from the parties." Id 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals was first asked to decide whether the trial 
court misapplied Rule 36(a) in deeming the requests admitted. Id. at ^ 6. If the appellate 
court concluded that the trial court's interpretation of the rule was correct, it was then 
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called upon to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
permit withdrawal of the admissions under Rule 36(b), given the overriding concern 
about the child's best interest. Id. 
The State argued that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in deeming that 
matters admitted because the court should not have faulted the State for failing to respond 
to requests for admissions the State never received. Id. at f^ 8. The Utah Court of 
Appeals reasoned as follows: 
Had the trial court in fact found that the State had never been served with 
the requests, the State's argument would be correct. However, the State 
reads too much into the trial court's findings of fact in this regard. 
Taken as a whole, the import of the court's finding is that while the 
responsible attorneys never received the requests, the requests were served 
upon their respective offices, which was enough to trigger the responsibility 
to respond within 30 days. 
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some internal routing problem. This is not a valid excuse. 
Id at fflf 8-9 (citations omitted). 
The State additionally argued, much like Van Den Eikhof, that "the type of 
admissions requested by the father were plainly objectionable, and the trial court erred in 
even considering them." Id. at If 21. The Utah Court of Appeals noted that the State's 
argument was "well taken, albeit untimely." Id. (emphasis added). The Court reasoned 
that while '"admit you lose' type requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are 
objectionable," . . . when a party fails to timely and properly object, "the party should 
nonetheless be held to have admitted the matter." Id. (citing Jensen, 702 P.2d 100-01). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals held as follows: 
We conclude the trial court in this case correctly implemented the mandate 
of Rule 36(a) by ruling that the requested matters were admitted by 
operation of law. The potential harshness of automatic admission is 
mitigated—and the need for the blanket exemption sought by the State 
completely undercut—by the escape hatch provided in Rule 36(b), which 
allows a trial court to withdraw or amend an admission "if the merits of the 
underlying action will be advanced by such withdrawal and if the party 
requesting the admissions fails to convince the court that it will be 
prejudiced by such withdrawal." As explained above, the trial court's 
decision not to override the admissions is reviewed under a somewhat more 
exacting abuse of discretion standard. 
Id at Tf 13 (citations omitted). 
Where E.R. is instructive on its points of similarity it is also equally instructive for 
its points of dissimilarity. Unlike the State, Van Den Eikhof s counsel has acknowledged 
receipt of Vista School's First Set of Discovery Requests. Further unlike the State, Van 
Den Eikhof failed to properly attempt to overcome the effect of the deemed admissions 
by proceeding under Rule 36(b). 
The foregoing analysis is clear: the trial court correctly applied the requirements of 
Rules 5 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as well as their interpretive case law 
when recognizing and then applying the deemed admissions. Accordingly, the judgment 
of the trial court must be affirmed. 
8. The trial court properly granted Vista School's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
As explained in the Summary of the Arguments section above, there was indeed a 
purpose to the order in which the trial court ruled on the parties' motions. The trial court 
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first examined Vista School's Motion to Strike Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit. The trial 
court, applying its "broad grant of discretion," correctly concluded that the affidavit was 
untimely and fraught with evidentiary problems. Once stricken, Van Den Eikhof s 
opposition to Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment was stripped of any proper 
evidence to oppose the Motion. The next interlocutory motion considered by the trial 
court was Van Den Eikhof s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. The trial court 
appropriately observed that Van Den Eikhof never even mentioned the required two-part 
Langeland test or attempted to apply its principles in his moving memorandum. This 
failure prevented the trial court from ever getting to a point where it was permitted to 
exercise discretion regarding the withdrawal or amendment of the deemed admissions. 
The trial court summarized its analysis as follows: 
On [Vista School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, [Vista School] has 32 
statements of fact all from the request for admissions, and according to 
Utah law those are conclusively proved. [Van Den Eikhof s] opposing 
memorandum attempts to disprove two of the asserted facts which, if done 
correctly, might prevent summary judgment. [Van Den Eikhof], however, 
offers no citation to any affidavit, any discovery or any other relevant 
materials. [Van Den Eikhof] also includes more unprofessional language. 
No genuine issue of material fact appears in regard to [Vista School's] 
motion for summary judgment. 
On the legal issues, the governmental immunity both because of substance 
and because of [Van Den Eikhof s] failure to file - 1 won't say it's 
meaningless, but the meager $300 undertaking I conclude bars [Van Den 
Eikhof s] claims. [Vista School's] analysis of those issues is very 
thorough. The response to it is simply insufficient. I conclude [Vista 
School] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and so [Vista School's] 
motion for summary judgment is granted. 
(R. at 536, 11:24-12:16). 
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Having already established that the trial court properly resolved each of the 
interlocutory motions underpinning the Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court must 
now confine its analysis to whether the trial court correctly applied the undisputed 
material facts to the law. There are two facets to this legal analysis: first, the effect of the 
deemed admissions upon Van Den Eikhof s causes of action; and, second, Van Den 
Eikhof s failure to follow various requirements of the GIA. 
The Legal Effect of the Deemed Admissions 
As thoughtfully examined and explained in the trial court's Order Granting [Vista 
School's] Motion for Summary Judgment, one or more of the necessary elements to 
establish a prima facie case for every one of Van Den Eikhof s five causes of action was 
disproved by virtue of the deemed admissions. (R. at 479-484, fflf 10-25). The trial 
court's Order contains Utah case citations setting forth the required elements for each 
cause of action, followed by an analysis of the deemed admissions disproving one or 
more of these required elements. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded all of Van 
Den Eikhof s causes of action were barred as a matter of law. 
Van Den Eikhof s Failure to Follow the GIA 
The Utah Strategic Planning Act for Educational Excellence, which is the statute 
creating public charter schools, provides as follows: "An employee of a charter school is 
a public employee and the governing body is a public employer in the same manner as a 
local school board for purposes of tort liability." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-514(l). 
Under Utah law, public school boards and school districts are "political subdivisions" and 
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therefore "governmental entities" as provided by the GIA. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
102(3) and (7). Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Vista School was a 
political subdivision and a governmental entity of the State of Utah. 
The GIA "governs all claims against governmental entities or against their 
employees or agents arising out of the perfoiTaance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101(2)(b). 
The GIA further provides that "an action under this chapter against a governmental entity 
for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of an 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a 
plaintiffs exclusive remedy." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-202(3)(a). The trial court 
therefore properly concluded that Van Den Eikhof s tort claims were brought in 
professed compliance with the GIA. (R. at 485, f 28). 
Upon determining that Van Den Eikhof s tort claims were brought pursuant to the 
GIA, the trial court then examined Van Den Eikhof s attempted compliance with GIA 
requirements. The GIA states as follows: 
At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum 
fixed by the court that is: 
(a) not less than $300; and 
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred 
by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the 
action or fails to recover judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-601(2). Lawsuits where the plaintiff fails to deposit this 
undertaking should be dismissed, albeit without prejudice. Rippstein v. City of Provo, 
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929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake Cnty., 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). 
Observing that Van Den Eikhof never paid the $300 undertaking upon filing his lawsuit, 
the trial court properly cited this failure as a basis for entry of summary judgment. (R. at 
536, 12:9-12). 
The trial court next reviewed the substance of Van Den Eikhof s tort claims in 
comparison to the GIA's express grants of immunity from suit. The GIA states: "A 
judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603. In paragraph 89 of Van Den Eikhof s 
Complaint, he requested "punitive damages for pain and suffering as well as loss of 
financial opportunities in the amount of three times (3X) the amount of judgment." (R. at 
13, | 89). Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed these claims as a matter of law. 
There is absolute immunity from suit under the GIA for claims arising out of or in 
connection with "infliction of mental anguish . . . [and] misrepresentation by an employee 
whether or not it is negligent or intentional." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(a) and (f). 
To the extent Van Den Eikhof was asserting in the aforementioned paragraph 89 of his 
Complaint by use of the phrase "for pain and suffering" a claim for damages for infliction 
of mental anguish, the trial court appropriately concluded that such claim was absolutely 
barred. (R. at 486, If 31). Similarly, the trial court properly concluded that Van Den 
Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation was likewise barred and 
must be dismissed as a matter of law. (R. at 486,132). 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court's application of the undisputed 
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material facts to the law, it is clear the trial court correctly granted Vista School's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Van Den Eikhof, however, takes umbrage at the trial court's 
analysis, contending the trial court "ignored" material issues of fact. (Van Den Eikhof 
Brief at 19). He contends the mere existence of the parties' competing motions for 
summary judgment demonstrates, ipso facto, a disputed material fact that prevented the 
trial court from granting Vista School's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Van Den 
Eikhof Brief at 18). Utah appellate courts have determined such an argument lacks merit. 
In D & L Supply v. Saurini, a supplier of goods sued a personal guarantor for 
money owed on an open account maintained by the personal guarantor's company with 
supplier. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1985). The personal guarantor filed an answer, asserting 
that he was not personally responsible for the unpaid bills and contesting the trial court's 
personal jurisdiction over him. Id. The supplier filed a motion for summary judgment 
supported by the affidavits of its president and others, asserting facts that supported the 
court's personal jurisdiction over the personal guarantor as well as the amount claimed to 
be due and owing. Id. The personal guarantor did not file any opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment, so the trial court entered judgment against the personal guarantor. 
Id at 421. 
On appeal, the personal guarantor argued that although he failed to properly 
oppose the supplier's motion for summary judgment the mere existence of the parties' 
contradictory pleadings precluded summary judgment. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court, reasoning as follows: 
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Rule 56(e) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] expressly rejects 
[personal guarantor's] premise. When a motion for summary judgment is 
filed and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an 
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by 
rule 56(e). 
Id. 
Similarly, in Kotter v, Kotter, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that a trial 
court committed reversible error when it denied summary judgment based upon requests 
for admissions that were deemed admitted when no timely responses were served. 2009 
UT App 60 at 122. The Kotter Court farther observed: 
While we recognize the harsh result rale 36 imposes on [the responding 
party], we also must observe the rule's intent: to facilitate discovery. . . . 
"The penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and parties who fail 
to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 36 should not lightly 
escape the consequences of the rule." 
Id at f 19 (citing Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1061). 
Accordingly, this Court must similarly reject Van Den Eikhof s argument on this 
issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Having thoroughly examined two lines of analysis, Vista School has conclusively 
demonstrated the following: (1) Van Den Eikhof failed to comply with nearly every 
required convention of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby 
entitling this Court to disregard his appellate brief and assume the correctness of the trial 
court's judgment; and (2) the trial court created a proper procedural foundation from 
which to dispose of the parties' various interlocutory motions, which, in turn, then 
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properly supported the trial court's legal conclusions when granting Vista School's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
7th DATED this 7m day of July 2011. 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
Lewis P. Reece 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set 
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shali be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be 
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record-
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a 
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 'with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner 
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as 
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or 
portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
n t h a r \ A / i c Q n r r l o r c P o o h n o r + w c h p l l h o ainV\+\cir\ +r> f i l o f\A/r\ h r i o f o M A k r i ^ f c h o l l p±\/r*r\r^r\ C H v-x^n^r* 
w u i w i v » i v j u v -» i v j ^ !d . u u u n pt<4i ty o i i u i i k>v^  v^i u k i ^ u t^» I I I O i v v u I^/I I V ^ I O . i \ u u i i ^ i 01 l a n G A O C C U \J\J u a u o o , 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised 
in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven 
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to 
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any 
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by 
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against 
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Advisory Committee Notes 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). 
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See 
also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable 
standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
J. Gregory Hardman [8200] 
Tyson C. Horrocks [ 12557] 
Counsel for Defendant 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-3688 
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 090503847 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; having received a proper Request to 
Submit for Decision for said Motion; having reviewed applicable cases and statutes relative to 
the merits of the Motion; having received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a hearing 
convened on October 20, 2010; and being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby, enters the 
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• FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On or about December 23, 2009, Plaintiff Steven Van Den Eikhof (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff5 or "Van Den Eikhof) filed his Complaint against Defendant Vista School (hereinafter 
"Vista"), which contains causes of action and/or claims for the following: First Cause of Action -
Breach of Contract. Refusal to Honor Contract; Second Cause of Action - Breach of Contract, 
Nonpayment of Benefits; Third Cause of Action - Fraud and.Fraud in the Inducement; Fourth 
Cause of Action - Negligent Misrepresentation; Fifth Cause of Action - Attorneys Fees and Costs; 
and Summary (Prayer for Relief) - claims for punitive damages. 
2. On May 20, 2010, Vista properly propounded its First Set of Requests for 
Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Van Den Eikhof 
(hereinafter "Vista's First Discovery Request"). The Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman, j^4, filed in 
support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment confirms this fact. 
3. Also on May 20, 2010, Vista filed with the Court a Certificate of Discovery for its 
First Discovery Request. Likewise, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman, [^5, confirms this fact. 
4. Vista's First Discovery Request advised Van Den Eikhof that the Requests for 
Admissions would be deemed admitted unless Van Den Eikhof served responses within 30 days 
from the date Vista's First Discovery Request was propounded. 
5. Van Den Eikhof has never served written responses to any of Vista's First 
Discovery Request, including the Requests for Admissions. 
6. Rule 36(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly indicates that requests 
for admissions will be deemed admitted if no responses are received from the requested party 
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within 30 days. Courts have confirmed that if a party fails to provide a timely response to 
requests for admissions, summary judgment may thereafter be granted based on the facts 
established by the unanswered admissions. This is because the "matters deemed admitted are 
conclusively established as true.55 Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge, 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985). 
Indeed, Utah courts have noted that "the rule does not say the court may admit the matter—it 
says ' [t]he matter is admitted' .... By simple operation of Rule. 3 6(a), parties who ignore requests 
for admissions do so at their peril." State v. N.R., 2 P.3d 948, 951 (Utah App. 2000). Utah 
courts have also stated that "a request for an admission of an ultimate fact or application of law 
to fact is proper," and further that "even if a request is objectionable, if a party fails to object and 
fails to respond to the request, that party should be held to have admitted the matter." Jensen, 
702 P.2d at 100-101. 
7. In the present case, Van Den Eikhof has failed to respond to Vista's Requests for 
Admissions and well more than 30 days have passed. Pursuant to Utah law, these requests for 
admissions of fact are now "conclusively established facts." 
8. Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
9. Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the undisputed material 
facts conclusively establish that Van Den Eikhof cannot satisfy any of the requisite elements to 
establish any of the causes of action or claims for relief set forth in his Complaint based on the 
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Requests for Admissions, which have all been deemed admitted, or due to the provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. * 
10. Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action is for "Breach of Contract, Refusal to 
Honor Original Offer." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged contract: 
The Defendant made a clear offer of employment on or about April 29, 2009 for a 
base salary of $34,622.00 [parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] in 
"- writing to Plaintiff. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to sign said offer to accept the 
contract. 
Plaintiff accepted this contract by signing Defendant's offer on May 1, 2009 and 
also by complying with all of its terms for employment. 
Defendant issued a different offer which had a base salary of $30,576.65 
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] which was $4,045.35 
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] less than the original signed 
contract. 
Defendant mandated that Plaintiff sign to maintain employment with Defendant 
for the 2009/2010 school year. 
When Plaintiff refused to sign the new offer, seeking to remain with his original 
contract he had made with Defendant, he was terminated. 
Complaint, ffi[61-65. 
11. The required elements necessary to form a legally enforceable contract are "offer, 
acceptance, competent parties, and consideration." Uhrhahn Const. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 
2008 UT App 41, [^12, 179 P.3d 808 (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 
732 (Utah 1985)). 
12. The admitted facts from Vista's Requests for Admissions conclusively 
demonstrate there was no offer to be accepted. 
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13. The admitted facts establish that Van Den Eikhof had to approve and sign a 
Salary Agreement as a condition precedent to the formation of a contract, which he never did as 
evidenced by the following Requests for Admissions: 
Please admit that the Vista Letter [the April 29, 2009 letter] contained conditions 
that had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista School. 
Admission 2. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve as a formal - , 
employment agreement. Admission 3. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will complete a "hiring process." 
Admission 4. 
Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to sign a Salary 
Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School. Admission 5. 
Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with Vista School. 
Admission 6. 
Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a Salary Agreement on or 
about August 14, 2009. Admission 7. 
14. Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action is for "Breach of Contract-
Nonpayment of Benefits." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged 
contract to pay particular benefits: 
Within the benefits package that Plaintiff accepted in Defendant's offer, said 
benefits would amount to approximately $1,389.00 [parenthetical spelling of 
dollar amount omitted] per month in cash value. 
On or about August 13, 2009, Plaintiff and other employees were told by 
Principal that School's intention was to give 100% paid medical insurance 
premiums. 
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Defendant included benefits within the first written contract amounting to 
approximately $1,389.00 [parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted] a 
month, which was also promised orally to Plaintiff. 
Defendant failed to provide said benefits to Plaintiff. 
Complaint, ffi[21, 39, 69 and 70. 
15. The following Requests for Admissions invalidate Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause 
of Action: : - '••" 
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written agreement 
wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no cost to you as 
alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint. Admission 17. 
Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with any written agreement 
that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as alleged in 
Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint. Admission 18. 
16. Additionally, if the elements necessary to form the basic employment 
contract as alleged in Van Den Eikhof s First Cause of Action were not present, as 
explained above, it logically follows that there could be no contract for related employee 
benefits. Accordingly, Van Den Eikhof s Second Cause of Action for breach of contract 
fails as a matter of law. 
17. Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action is for "Fraud and Fraud in the 
Inducement." Van Den Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged fraud: 
Defendant made representations within its first contract offer that were accepted 
that Plaintiff would have a teaching position with a base pay of $34,622.00 
[parenthetical spelling of dollar amount omitted]. Such representations were 
furthered by oral statements, the fact that Plaintiff was sent for training in 
California, and the fact that Plaintiff attended a week long teacher training in St. 
George over the summer with no other contract offers until the school year had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
already started at Washington County School District and George Washington 
Academy. 
Vista School's representations were material facts made to induce Plaintiff to 
work for School. The fact that a second contract was offered to Plaintiff so late 
caused harm to Plaintiff in that he could not find another teaching position. 
Plaintiff reasonably relied on the original contract, relied on the fact that it would 
not be altered for at least the 2009/2010 school year, and gave up another teaching 
position based on the original salary agreed to by Defendant. 
Defendant knew or should have known that such a move would compel Plaintiff' 
to accept the contract offer. 
Complaint, ffi[73-76. 
18. The elements of a fraud claim include the following: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injur}7 and damage. 
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ^16, fn. 38, 201 P.3d 966 {citing Dugan v. Jones, 
' 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)). 
19. In this instance, the formation of an employment contract would be the "presently 
existing material fact" upon which the entire fraud claim is predicated. However, the above-
cited Requests for Admissions clearly establish that an employment contract was never formed. 
20. Additionally, the following Requests for Admissions eliminates Van Den 
Eikhof s ability to claim there was an inducement and justified reliance upon it, w7hich are 
necessary elements to prove fraud: 
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Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista reception as alleged in 
Paragraph 32 of your Complaint. Admission 14, 
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training as 
alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint. Admission 15. 
Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista teacher training 
alleged in Paragraph 38 of your Complaint. Admission 16. 
Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications with employees or 
representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually 
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. Admission 29. 
Please admit that you were made aware on or before August 2, 2009 that Vista 
School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had originally 
believed. Admission 30. 
Please admit that you had communications with a Vista School employee 
regarding your base salary on or before August 25 2009. Admission 31. 
Please admit that George Washington Academy never presented you with a 
written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year. Admission 32. 
21. Accordingly, Van Den Eikhof s Third Cause of Action for fraud fails as a matter 
of law. 
22. Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action is for "Negligent Misrepresentation-
Defendant waited until the start of the fall school year to propose a new contract." Van Den 
Eikhof contends as follows regarding the alleged negligent misrepresentation: 
In the alternative to any fraud causes of action, Plaintiff asserts negligent 
misrepresentation with the fact that Defendant waited until after the 2009/2010 • 
school year had started within Washington County in an attempt to force Plaintiff 
to accept a new contract for lower pay and lesser benefits knowing that he would 
be unable to find another teaching position with another school. 
Defendant made representations that were at least negligent and careless so as to 
induce action by Plaintiff to accept the contract offered. 
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Defendant had a duty of care to Plaintiff to act reasonably which would have 
included giving Plaintiff adequate notice ahead of time of the contractual change 
to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek other teaching positions if he so chose to 
do so. 
Complaint, ffi|78-80. 
23. Negligent misrepresentation is defined as follows: 
./;,Where(l) one having..apeqimary interest in 
position to know material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes a false 
representation concerning them, (4) expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if the other elements of fraud 
are also present. 
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah App. 1992) {citing Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967)). 
24. The same Requests for Admissions that defeated Van Den Eikhof s Third 
Cause of Action for fraud likewise defeat his Fourth Cause of Action for negligent 
misrepresentation. If there was no contract there could have been no false representations 
about a non-existent contract. Similarly, there is no way for a claimant to validly assert 
reasonable reliance upon the formation of a contract he has acknowledged never existed. 
25. Van Den Eikhof s Fifth Cause of Action is for "Attorneys fees and Costs.5' 
Van Den Eikhof would have to first prevail on one or more of his other causes of action 
and then establish a contractual or statutory basis under Utah law before he would be 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. Since he can do neither this claim also 
fails as a matter of law. ^ 
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26. The Utah Strategic Planning Act for Educational Excellence, which is the statute 
creating public charter schools, provides as follows: "An employee of a charter school is a public 
employee and the governing body is a public employer in the same manner as a local school 
board for purposes of tort liability." Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-514(l). Under Utah law, public 
school boards and school districts are "political subdivisions" and therefore "governmental 
entities" as provided by the GovernmentaHmmunity Act of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-
102(3) and (7). Therefore, Vista is a political subdivision and governmental entity of the State of 
Utah. 
27. The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah "governs all claims against 
governmental entities or against their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code 
Ann. §63G-7-101(2)(b). The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah further provides that "an 
action under this chapter against a governmental entity for an injury caused by an act or omission 
that occurs during the performance of an employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy." Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-202(3)(a). 
28. Van Den Eikhof s Complaint against Vista is brought pursuant to the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. See Complaint, ffi[2-5. 
29. The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah states: "A judgment may not be 
rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages." Utah Code Ann. 
§63G-7-603. 
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30. In paragraph 89 of Van Den Eikhof s Complaint, he requests "punitive damages 
for pain and suffering as well as loss of financial opportunities in the amount of three times (3X) 
the amount of judgment." Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed as a matter of law as 
they violate the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
31. Additionally, there is absolute immunity from suit under the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah for claims arising out of or in connection with "infliction of mental' 
anguish, ....[and] misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional/ 
Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-301(5)(b) and (f). To the extent Van Den Eikhof is asserting in the 
aforementioned paragraph 89 of his Complaint by use of the phrase "for pain and suffering'' a 
claim for damages for infliction of mental anguish, such claim is absolutely barred. 
32. Van Den Eikhof s Fourth Cause of Action for negligent misrepresentation is 
likewise barred and must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
33. Additionally, the Court observes that Van Den Eikhof s effort to oppose Vista's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was wholly deficient. 
34. The main contention of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was that his counsel was not properly served with 
Defendant's First Discovery Request and, accordingly, that the Requests for Admissions should 
be withdrawn. 
35. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
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The motion, memorandum and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law (emphasis added). 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. : 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response (emphasis added). 
36. Examination of Vista's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that every 
assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and 
sequence for the filing of Defendant's First Discovery Request. Therefore, each of the deemed 
admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed material facts that Van Den Eikhof 
had an obligation to oppose by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rules 56(c) and (e). 
37. Conversely, examination of Van Den Eikhof s Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment reveals that it was not supported by any affidavits, 
references to Vista's pleadings, or any other form of evidence required under Rule 56(c) to 
properly oppose a motion for summary judgment. 
38. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that once the moving party on a motion 
for summary judgment has properly established "a prima facie case for summary judgment," the 
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opponent of the motion "must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial 
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P.2d 10405 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Bush Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 
1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). 
39. Since Van Den Eikhof s opposition memorandum is facially defective, the Court 
may properly disregard Van Den Eikhof s "Facts in Dispute" and enter summary judgment in. 
favor of Vista because the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment established a prima facie case for summary judgment. 
40. The language of Rule 56(e) is clear: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added). 
41. Finally, although not determinative of the outcome reached herein, the 
Court notes that the testimony and exhibits proffered in the multiple affidavits of Vista's 
legal counsel (specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions (e.g., emails exchanged by counsel, Vista's counsel's 
postage records, etc.)) clearly preponderates in favor of Van Den Eikhof having been 
properly served with Defendant's First Discovery Request. 
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I 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters 
the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
D A T E m J <&> d a y o f ( P ( y f c f e r 2010. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JmQE G. RAND BEACHAM 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered via 
fist class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, as well as transmitted electronically, on this Q day of 
November 2010. to the following: 
Bryan T. Adamson, Esq. 
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C, 
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2 
St. George, UT 84770 
badamson@dixielegal.com 
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ADDENDUM 3 
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{ 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
J. Gregory Hardman [8200] 
Tyson C. Horrocks [12557] 
Counsel for Defendant 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435)628-3688 
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND OR 
WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 090503847 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions; having received a proper 
Request to Submit for Decision for said Motion; having reviewed applicable cases and statutes 
relative to the merits of the Motion; having received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a 
hearing convened on October 20, 2010; and being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby, 
enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The basis for Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is centered 
around his contention that he was never properly served with Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents 
(hereinafter "Defendant's First Discovery Request"). 
2./ \ However, the testimony and exhibits proffered in the multiple affidavits of 
Defendant's legal counsel (specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions (e.g., emails exchanged by counsel, 
Vista's counsel's postage records, etc.)) clearly preponderates in favor of Plaintiff having 
been properly served with Defendant's First Discovery Request. 
2. Accordingly, there is no basis in law or fact for Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw Admissions. 
3. Moreover, the form of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is 
severely deficient. 
4. Under Utah law, a party seeking to withdraw or amend admissions must (a) show 
that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of 
action, and (b) introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that 
the matters admitted against it are in fact untrue. A party's own unsworn denial of the matters 
admitted against it is not sufficient. 
5. Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
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Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a 
pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party 
who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or 
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 
Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending 
action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be 
used against him in any other proceeding (emphasis added). 
6. In Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
proper procedures parties must follow and the test trial courts must apply in regards to a Rule 
36(b) motion for withdrawal or amendment of admissions. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). The 
following statements, explanations and analyses from Langeland are controlling upon this 
Court's examination of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. 
7. The Supreme Court observed that 
[o]ur decisions interpreting [Rule 36(b)] have used similar language, conditioning 
the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's preliminary conditions: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are 
conclusively established as true unless the trial court, on motion by the defendant, 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. The trial court has the 
discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions when the 
presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the party obtaining 
the admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be prejudiced in maintaining 
his action. The trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard the 
admissions. 
Id. at 1060 (citing Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis 
in original). The Supreme Court continued its analysis by stating 
[bjecause the trial court's decision to grant a rule 36(b) motion is not entirely 
discretionary, our review of such a decision is not a typical review for "abuse of 
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discretion.55 Instead, we review these decisions in two steps, using what might be 
called a "conditional55 discretionary standard. In the first step, we review the trial 
court's determinations as to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve the 
presentation of the merits and whether amendment or withdrawal would result in 
prejudice to the nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's 
discretion to grant or deny the motion. The trial court has discretion to deny a 
motion to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion comes into play 
only after the preliminary requirements are satisfied. Decisions placed within 
the discretion of the trial court can be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of 
discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). But because the rule does not give 
the trial court discretion to'-disregard the preliminary7 conditions of rule 
36(b), its judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied is 
subject to a somewhat more exacting standard of review. 
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added). 
8. After announcing the elements of the test to determine whether admissions should 
be withdrawn or amended, the Supreme Court then explained the responsibilities of the parties 
on each side of a Rule 36(b) motion. The Supreme Court determined as follows: 
Having concluded that the burden [to establish the first half of the first part of the 
test, i.e., serving the presentation of the merits] falls on the party moving for 
amendment, we are still faced with the question of just how that burden may be 
met. [The party seeking amendment or withdrawal] argues that on the basis of 
federal court interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
presentation of the merits of an action is served by amending admissions anytime 
the merits are contested. Clark v. City ofMunster, 115 F.R.D. 609, 612 
(N.D.Ind.1987). Arguing from this authority, [the party seeking amendment or 
withdrawal] submits that its own unsworn denial of the matters admitted against it 
should suffice to convince the court that a presentation of the merits would be 
served by amendment of its admissions. However, the time to deny admissions is 
within thirty days of receiving the request for admissions. Once these matters 
have been admitted against a party, something more than a bare denial is required 
to convince the court that the admissions should be withdrawn or amended and 
that the merits of the matter should be argued in court. The test under rule 36(b) 
may therefore be articulated as follows: To show that a presentation of the 
merits of an action would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an 
admission, the party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show that 
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the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the 
underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or 
otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted 
against it are in fact untrue. 
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added). 
9. Applying this two-part test to the facts of Langeland the Supreme Court 
determined that 
[the party seeking amendment or withdrawal] has failed to' come forward with 
evidence of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted against it 
are in fact untrue. Consequently, [the party seeking amendment or withdrawal] 
has not established that the presentation of the case on the merits would be 
subserved by the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. 
Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that 
[t]he record is devoid of any sworn statement that [the subject admissions are] 
untrue. Instead, both the brief and the motion focus almost exclusively on the 
second-tier requirement that the nonmoving party fails to show prejudice from the 
amendment or withdrawal of the admissions. 
Id. When this occurs, the Supreme Court stated that such failure "relieves the [the non-moving 
party] of the burden of showing that he would suffer prejudice as a result of the withdrawal or 
amendment of the admissions, []." Id. 
10. Examination of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions reveals that 
it, too, is devoid of any sworn statement or other appropriate evidence challenging the veracity of 
the deemed admitted Request for Admissions. 
11. Further, unlike the moving party in Langeland who at least made an effort—albeit 
deficient—to address the second part of the two-part test, Plaintiff has not even mentioned the 
two-part test. In fact, his motion and memorandum fail to mention Rule 36(b) altogether. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters 
the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions is 
denied.
 a J y J^ 
I r\ // 
DATED this #0 day of (j cAr") 2010. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
/fifD/ JUDGE Q. RAND BEACHAf 
t^ /Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND OR WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS to be 
delivered via fist class U.S. Mail postage prepaid, as well as transmitted electronically, on this 
p-ffi day of November 2010. to the following: 
Bryan T. Adamson, Esq. 
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C 
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2 
St. George, UT 84770 
badamson@dixielegal.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
]AU^M *J$GW_ 
Legal Assist 
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(' 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
J. Gregory Hardman [8200] 
Tyson C. Horrocks [12557] 
Counsel for Defendant 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-3688 
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
DATED AUGUST 25, 2010 
Civil No. 090503847 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
The Court, having reviewed all briefs, affidavits and exhibits filed in support of or in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated 
August 25, 2010; having received a proper Request to Submit for Decision for said Motion; 
having reviewed applicable cases and statutes relative to the merits of the Motion; having 
received the arguments of the parties' counsel at a hearing convened on October 20, 2010; and 
/£•>. 
V 
'" O J" A <*f~/ 
*A~.-^f$ 4,? 
% ? * ^ A •' 
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being fully advised in the matter; now, hereby, enters the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On August 2, 2010, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Defendant's Memorandum was 
supported by the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated August 2, 2010. 
3. On or about August 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Examination of Plaintiff s Memorandum reveals 
that its section entitled "Facts in Dispute" was not supported by any affidavit or other form of 
evidence as required by U.R.C.P. 56(e). 
4. On August 25, 2010, Defendant filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Defendant's Reply Memorandum on file with 
the Court.) Plaintiffs failure to properly support his Memorandum with affidavits or other 
required evidence was one of the primary counterarguments in Defendant's Reply Memorandum. 
5. Furthermore, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of 
Contract Claims on July 29, 2010. 
6. On August 19, 2010, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Terms. Plaintiffs failure to properly 
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support his Memorandum with affidavits or other required evidence was one of the primary 
counterarguments in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition. 
On August 26, 2010, Defendant's counsel received a certified mail envelope in which was 
enclosed, among other documents, a copy of the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof, dated 
August 25, 2010. 
7., ' Utah courts have regularly observed that formalor evidentiary defects in an 
affidavit in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived unless the 
party opposing the affidavit files a motion to strike. See, e.g., Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Utah 
2d383,453P.2d701 (1969);Howickv. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972); 
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979); Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983); Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
8. Van Den Eikhof s Affidavit is procedurally defective because it was filed weeks 
after his Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
9. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure implies that affidavits and other 
evidentiary materials must be filed contemporaneously with the responsive memorandum. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
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10. Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on or about August 11, 2010. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response makes absolutely 
no reference to any supporting affidavit or other proper form of evidence. Yet, Plaintiff 
submitted his Affidavit two weeks or more later; and by this time, Defendant had already 
properly opposed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims as 
well as issued Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
11. Plaintiffs late filing of his Affidavit is procedurally defective. 
12. At the very least, upon recognizing this procedural error in his briefing, Plaintiff 
should have filed a motion with the Court to permit a late-filed affidavit; and in this event, 
Defendant should be afforded an opportunity to file appropriate supplemental briefs and 
affidavits to address the factual contentions set forth in the late-filed affidavit. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e). 
13. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its many, many case 
annotations require factual assertions in affidavits to be made on personal, first-hand knowledge. 
Id. (stating "supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge"'); see also 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ^ |20, 136 P.3d 1252 (stating "affidavits submitted in 
support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based on the personal 
knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by the trial court" if they are not). 
14. Examination of the Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof reveals that it is nothing 
more than a non-specific form affidavit. 
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15. To the extent the Affidavit was offered in support of the "Facts in Dispute" 
section of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which is suggested by the caption title of the Affidavit, it is clearly not based on Plaintiffs first-
hand, personal knowledge. 
16. The 'Tacts in Dispute" section of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (i.e., Plaintiffs claimed "Actual Facts") states as'..;' 
follows: 
Actual Fact: Plaintiff received an email on May 19, 2010 that had an 
attachment labeled "Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests." It should be 
noted that settlement negotiations were ongoing at this time. Since the email 
stated that originals would follow in the mail, Plaintiff never opened the email 
attachment. Many attorneys send proposed paperwork in emails or discuss filing 
things that never end up getting filed. 
The originals were never sent and since email is not a proper method for 
service of discovery, the discovery was never served. In fact, counsel for Plaintiff 
had not seen the discovery requests until the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
served. 
Actual Fact: Plaintiff objects to these admissions being admitted as the 
Requests were never properly served. 
17. Clearly, these "Actual Facts" are the first-hand perceptions (actually mostly legal 
arguments) of Plaintiff s counsel, not Plaintiff himself. 
18. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its many, many case 
annotations further provide that affidavits "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App at J^20 (stating 
"[an affidavit] largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs" may not be 
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considered by the trial court); Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
19. A lay witness5 opinion testimony is rarely admissible as evidence and "is limited 
to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in 
issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. 
20. As explained above, Plaintiff could not have been the person who perceived the 
"Actual Facts"; rather, it was his attorney who claims to have done so. Moreover, examination 
of the above "Actual Facts" reveals that they are mostly the legal opinions of Plaintiff s counsel. 
Legal opinions should be similarly stricken from affidavits. See, e.g., Capital Assets Fin. Serv. v. 
Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, cert, granted 9%2 P.2d 87, affd 994 P.2d 201. 
21. Lastly, Plaintiffs Affidavit makes no detailed factual statements and refers to no 
documents. Utah courts have reasoned that bare assertions in an affidavit offered in opposition 
to summary judgment motion will not suffice to oppose the motion. Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 
P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) (reasoning that bare assertions in an affidavit offered in opposition to 
summary judgment that expert has reviewed the facts and based his or her opinion on them will 
not suffice). 
22. Therefore, Plaintiffs Affidavit must be stricken. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby enters 
the following Order: 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven 
Van Den Eikhof, dated August 25, 2010, is granted. 
DATED thQ QJ) day o f ( g i ( 5 f c b ^ 2010. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
kjPGE Q. RAND BEAGHAM 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true a correct copy of the UNSIGNED ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN VAN 
DEN EIKHOF, DATED AUGUST 25, 2010 to be delivered via fist class U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, as well as transmitted electronically, on this tP day of November 2010. to the 
following: ... ..'•,....„•. . ...:,\ •'./.'•'.. ".v.:./..... . . . ; .... 
Bryan T. Adamson, Esq. 
THE JUSTICE FIRM, LEG. 
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2 
St. George, UT 84770 
badamson@dixielegal.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
W/vl I I D 
I \\AMJljifAjA_ ^ht7A9_ 
Legal Assistant / u \ 
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